Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/81462 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFN Working Paper No. 738
Verlag: 
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate harsher times after defections as leniency reduces recidivism and lowers post-conviction prices. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency, deterrence is unaffected but prices grow. Differences between treatments in Stockholm and Rome suggest culture may affect optimal law enforcement.
Schlagwörter: 
Cartels
Collusion
Coordination
Competition policy
Deterrence
Desistance
Law enforcement
Price-fixing
Punishment
Recidivism
Whistleblowers
JEL: 
C73
C92
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
296.88 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.