Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/79787 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2013: Wettbewerbspolitik und Regulierung in einer globalen Wirtschaftsordnung - Session: Monetary Policy II No. B01-V2
Verlag: 
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Kiel und Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
The New Keynesian DSGE literature has come to the consensus that, from the perspective of business cycle stabilization, countries are worse off in terms of welfare by forming a monetary union. This consensus, however, is based on the assumption of monetary policy being optimal. Using a standard two-country model, this paper shows that under suboptimal monetary policy, countries may gain in welfare by forming a monetary union, highlighting an important inherent benefit of fixing the exchange rate. Whether countries benefit from a monetary union depends primarily on the degree of price stickiness and how monetary policy is conducted: If prices are rather sticky and if monetary policy is not very aggressive towards inflation, forming a monetary union is beneficial. In contrast, asymmetries in the degree of price stickiness between countries are not of any importance for a monetary union to be welfare-enhancing or not.
JEL: 
F41
F33
E52
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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