Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/77679 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 4271
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper provides a model of “social hysteresis,” whereby long, deep recessions demotivate workers and thereby lead them to change their work ethic. In switching from a pro-work to an anti-work identity, their incentives to seek and retain work fall and consequently their employment chances fall. In this way, temporary recessions may come to have permanent effects on aggregate employment. We also show that these permanent effects, along with the underlying identity switches, can be avoided through stabilization policy. The size of the government expenditure multiplier can be shown to depend on the composition of identities in the workforce.
JEL: 
J28
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.