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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 1075
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider taxation by a Leviathan government and by a utilitarian government in the presence of heterogeneous locations within a country, when migration from one country to another is and is not possible. In a closed economy, a utilitarian government may transfer income from the poor to the rich to reduce rents earned by absentee landlords. When the rich are mobile, a tax on them induces little migration because the tax will reduce the rents on land inhabited by the rich. A race to the bottom need not appear.
Schlagwörter: 
taxes
land rents
property values
migration
redistribution
JEL: 
H21
H70
R21
R23
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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