Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73843 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 160
Publisher: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Abstract: 
I investigate minority votes in the German Council of Economic Experts. The dataset contains information on the voting behavior of the council members over the period 1971–2011. The results show that the best predictor of minority voting is being nominated by the trade unions: a council member nominated by the trade unions isabout 70 percentage points more likely to vote against the majority opinion of the German Council of Economic Experts. This voting pattern indicates that the channel of political appointment influences voting behavior.
Subjects: 
Decision making in committees
minority voting
policy preferences
German Council of Economic Experts
JEL: 
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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