Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73840 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 80
Publisher: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Abstract: 
Many countries pursue an immigration policy that is targeted at attracting high skilled workers. Borjas (1995) has shown that assuming perfect labor markets immigration leads to a welfare gain for the native population, the so-called immigration surplus. Thus, as the labor market for high skilled workers exhibits few frictions, high skilled immigration should lead to a welfare gain. Nevertheless, this argumentation implicitly assumes that immigration has no influence on the qualification structure of natives. In this paper I show that if natives anticipate high skilled immigration, fewer natives acquire a high education level. In labor markets that are not frictionless this effect can be such strong that high skilled immigration leads to a welfare loss for natives. Moreover, if high skilled migration is expected but not realized, this expectation generates a welfare loss.
Subjects: 
Immigration
native welfare
education structure
immigration surplus
JEL: 
H62
J24
J61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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