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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 18
Verlag: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the incentives of a government to privatize a state owned firm. Assumingprice cap regulation, a unionized labor market and wage bargaining the government’sgains from privatization depend on two effects. While the government looses controlover the firm’s investment and employment decisions, the union’s bargaining positioncan be weakened by privatization. Since price cap regulation tends to increase the wage under privatization, the government’s incentives to privatize are low if the union’s bargaining power is high. Considering different kinds of in-vestments does not change this result qualitatively.
Schlagwörter: 
Wage bargaining regulation privatization
JEL: 
H32
L32
L33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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