Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73755 
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
ifo Working Paper No. 18
Publisher: 
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Munich
Abstract: 
We analyze the incentives of a government to privatize a state owned firm. Assumingprice cap regulation, a unionized labor market and wage bargaining the government’sgains from privatization depend on two effects. While the government looses controlover the firm’s investment and employment decisions, the union’s bargaining positioncan be weakened by privatization. Since price cap regulation tends to increase the wage under privatization, the government’s incentives to privatize are low if the union’s bargaining power is high. Considering different kinds of in-vestments does not change this result qualitatively.
Subjects: 
Wage bargaining regulation privatization
JEL: 
H32
L32
L33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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