Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/73416 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
BGPE Discussion Paper No. 67
Verlag: 
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE), Nürnberg
Zusammenfassung: 
Microfinance currently experiences a huge inflow of private investors and a surge in the use of market instruments. This raises the question of what market equilibria in microfinance markets look like and which kinds of market failure tend to afflict them. The present paper conducts an equilibrium analysis of Besley and Coate's (1995) group lending model with enforcement problems.We show that a consideration of repayment rates alone is not sufficient to predict market outcomes, as it is biased towards group lending. Market equilibria are likely to exhibit the same kinds of market failure as equilibria in adverse selection models, viz., financial fragility, redlining, and credit rationing. Social sanctions ameliorate these problems, but do not eliminate them.
Schlagwörter: 
microfinance
group lending
enforcement
JEL: 
G21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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