Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/71890 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers No. 16/2010
Verlag: 
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In innovation contests, the progress of the competing firms in the innovation process is usually their private information. We analyze an innovation contest in which research firms have a stochastic technology to develop innovations at a fixed cost, but their progress is publicly announced. We make a comparison with the case of no information revelation: if the progress is disclosed, the expected profit of the firms is higher, but the expected profit of the sponsor is lower. Additionally, we show that firms may voluntarily reveal their information.
Schlagwörter: 
Contest
innovation
information revelation
JEL: 
O32
D82
D72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
589.22 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.