Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70733 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 2009-17a
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA
Zusammenfassung: 
Securitization does not explain the reluctance among lenders to renegotiate home mortgages. We focus on seriously delinquent borrowers from 2005 through the third quarter of 2008 and show that servicers renegotiate similarly small fractions of securitized and portfolio loans. The results are robust to several different definitions of renegotiation and hold in subsamples where unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be small. We argue that information issues endemic to home mortgages where lenders negotiate with large numbers of borrowers lead to barriers to renegotiation fundamentally different from those present with other types of debt.
Schlagwörter: 
mortgage
foreclosure
modification
renegotiation
JEL: 
D11
D12
G21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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