Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/70284 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
EPRI Working Paper No. 2012-1
Verlag: 
The University of Western Ontario, Economic Policy Research Institute (EPRI), London (Ontario)
Zusammenfassung: 
A view advanced in the aftermath of the late-2000s financial crisis is that lower than optimal interest rates lead to excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries. We evaluate this view in a quantitative dynamic model where interest rate policy affects risk taking by changing the amount of safe bonds available as collateral for repo transactions. Given properly priced collateral, lower than optimal interest rates reduce risk taking. However, if intermediaries can augment their collateral by issuing assets whose risk is underestimated by rating agencies, lower than optimal interest rates contribute to excessive risk taking and amplify the severity of recessions.
Schlagwörter: 
financial intermediation
risk taking
optimal interest rate policy
capital regulation
JEL: 
E44
E52
G28
D53
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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