Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/69519 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 1825
Verlag: 
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
Development assistance has been criticized for a lack of coordination between aid donors. This paper argues that competition for export markets and political support prevents donor countries from closer coordination of aid activities. To test these hypotheses, we perform logit and fractional logit estimations for a large sample of recipient countries and aid activities since the early 1970s. Our empirical results reveal that export competition between donors is a major impediment to aid coordination. Tough less conclusive, we also find some evidence that donors' competition over political support prevents them from coordinating aid activities more closely.
Schlagwörter: 
development aid
donor coordination
trade interests
export similarity
UN voting
JEL: 
F35
F42
F53
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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