Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/69506 
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 13-009
Publisher: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Abstract: 
We study competitive awarding procedures of short haul railway passenger services in Germany from 1995 to 2011 by means of a newly collected data set. In particular, we use regression techniques to investigate the determinants of the number of bidders, the identity of the winning bidder and the subsidy level. We find that there are more bidders when the contract duration is high and the revenue risk low. The dominant operator is more likely to win contracts if it is the incumbent, the network is large, the contract duration is high, when used rolling stock is admitted and when there are few other bidders.
Subjects: 
competitive tendering
market entry
networks
public procurement
railroads
JEL: 
D44
H57
L92
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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