Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67112
Authors: 
Budzinski, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
Ilmenau Economics Discussion Paper, Ilmenau University of Technology, Institute of Economics 72
Abstract: 
The paper discussed the economic theory of international antitrust institutions. Economic theory shows that non-coordinated competition policies of regimes that are territorially smaller than the international markets on which business companies compete violate cross-border allocative efficiency and are deficient with respect to global welfare. At the same time, some diversity of antitrust institutions and policies promotes dynamic and evolutionary efficiency so that globally binding, worldwide homogenous competition rules do not represent a first-best solution either. After reviewing the existing international antitrust institutions and their prospects and limits from an economic perspective (with a focus on the International Competition Network, ICN), the paper discusses reform proposals from economic literature.
Subjects: 
international competition policy
international antitrust
International
Competition Network
global governance
WTO
institutions
international organizations
JEL: 
F02
F53
F55
K21
L40
D02
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
633.39 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.