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Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf >
DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/67051
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| Title: | | Strategic obfuscation and consumer protection policy in financial markets: Theory and experimental evidence  |
| Authors: | | Gu, Yiquan Wenzel, Tobias |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | DICE Discussion Paper 76 |
| Abstract: | | This paper studies obfuscation decisions by firms in retail financial markets theoretically and experimentally. We show that more prominent firms are more likely to obfuscate. While prominent firms always choose maximum obfuscation, the obfuscation by less prominent firms depends on the degree of asymmetry in prominence and consumer protection policy. We evaluate the impact of a consumer protection policy that limits the scope of obfuscation. We show that such a policy may not be effective as less prominent firms may increase their obfuscation practice. |
| Subjects: | | Obfuscation Financial markets Consumer protection Experiment |
| JEL: | | G20 D14 D18 C92 |
| ISBN: | | 978-3-86304-075-8 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
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