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dc.contributor.authorCasarico, Alessandraen_US
dc.contributor.authorFacchini, Giovannien_US
dc.contributor.authorFrattini, Tommasoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-27T10:40:42Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-27T10:40:42Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66875-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3981en_US
dc.subject.jelF22en_US
dc.subject.jelJ61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordillegal immigrationen_US
dc.subject.keywordamnestiesen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor market mismatchen_US
dc.subject.keywordwelfare stateen_US
dc.subject.stwIllegale Einwanderungen_US
dc.subject.stwStraffreiheiten_US
dc.subject.stwMigrationspolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsmarktflexibilitäten_US
dc.subject.stwSozialstaaten_US
dc.subject.stwOECD-Staatenen_US
dc.titleWhat drives immigration amnesties?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn730412008en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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