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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66875
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| Title: | | What drives immigration amnesties?  |
| Authors: | | Casarico, Alessandra Facchini, Giovanni Frattini, Tommaso |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3981 |
| Abstract: | | We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model. |
| Subjects: | | illegal immigration amnesties labor market mismatch welfare state |
| JEL: | | F22 J61 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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