Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66875
Authors: 
Casarico, Alessandra
Facchini, Giovanni
Frattini, Tommaso
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Finance 3981
Abstract: 
We develop a general model of legal and illegal immigration to understand the basic tradeoffs faced by a government in the decision to implement an immigration amnesty in the presence of a selective immigration policy. We show that two channels play an important role: an amnesty is more likely the more restricted are the occupational opportunities of undocumented immigrants and the less redistributive is the welfare state. Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalizations carried out by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by the channels identified in our theoretical model.
Subjects: 
illegal immigration
amnesties
labor market mismatch
welfare state
JEL: 
F22
J61
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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