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ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66871
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| Title: | | Strategic complexities in the combinatorial clock auction  |
| Authors: | | Knapek, Stephan Wambach, Achim |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | CESifo Working Paper: Industrial Organisation 3983 |
| Abstract: | | Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial. |
| Subjects: | | combinatorial clock auction |
| JEL: | | D44 L96 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
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