Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66871
Authors: 
Knapek, Stephan
Wambach, Achim
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Industrial Organisation 3983
Abstract: 
Recently, the combinatorial clock auction has become more and more common in the auctioning of telecommunication licenses. Although the auction design is complex, the promise is that bidding becomes simple - truthtelling is close to optimal. We show that this claim is too strong. The auction entails several strategic complexities which make bidding non-trivial.
Subjects: 
combinatorial clock auction
JEL: 
D44
L96
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
316.63 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.