EconStor >
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim >
ZEW Discussion Papers >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66780
  
Title:Cartel enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the duration of investigations PDF Logo
Authors:Hüschelrath, Kai
Laitenberger, Ulrich
Smuda, Florian
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:ZEW Discussion Papers 12-071
Abstract:We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission's speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.
Subjects:Competition Policy
Empirical Analysis
Cartels
European Union
Fines
Leniency
Duration of Investigation
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-326231
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:ZEW Discussion Papers
Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des ZEW

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
729896323.pdf146.29 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66780

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.