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Title:Privatización y fusiones en oligopolios mixtos PDF Logo
Authors:Méndez Naya, José
Issue Date:2007
Citation:[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 34 [Year:] 2007 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 37-52
Abstract (Translated):The aim of this paper is to complement the existing literature on horizontal mergers, by setting a Cournot mixed oligopoly model. Specifically, the merger paradox is qualified by proving that a merger could be profitable for the merging firms even if it does not include most market firms. Furthermore, it is proved that a merger can only be welfare improving if the degree of privatization of the public firm is low enough.
Subjects:mixed oligopoly
mergers .
Document Type:Article
Appears in Collections:Estudios de Economia, Department of Economics, University of Chile

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