|
EconStor >
University of Chile >
Department of Economics, University of Chile >
Estudios de Economia, Department of Economics, University of Chile >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66720
|
| | |
| Title: | | Privatización y fusiones en oligopolios mixtos  |
| Authors: | | Méndez Naya, José |
| Issue Date: | | 2007 |
| Citation: | | [Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 34 [Year:] 2007 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 37-52 |
| Abstract (Translated): | | The aim of this paper is to complement the existing literature on horizontal mergers, by setting a Cournot mixed oligopoly model. Specifically, the merger paradox is qualified by proving that a merger could be profitable for the merging firms even if it does not include most market firms. Furthermore, it is proved that a merger can only be welfare improving if the degree of privatization of the public firm is low enough. |
| Subjects: | | mixed oligopoly privatization mergers . |
| JEL: | | L00 L13 L33 |
| Document Type: | | Article |
| Appears in Collections: | | Estudios de Economia, Department of Economics, University of Chile
|
| Files in This Item:
| |
|
| No. of Downloads:
| |
| last Month |
last 3 Month |
total |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66720
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|