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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66714
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| Title: | | Esquemas de incentivos y carteras de inversión innovadoras  |
| Authors: | | Loyola, Gino Portilla, Yolanda |
| Issue Date: | | 2010 |
| Citation: | | [Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 37 [Year:] 2010 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 43-66 |
| Abstract (Translated): | | This article characterizes the properties of the compensation scheme of delegated portfolio management that would lead to the selection of high risk-high return portfolios. In particular, it provides conditions under which a non-monotone payment structure emerges as an optimal contract, which rewards extreme results and punishes moderate ones. |
| Subjects: | | executive compensation delegated portfolio management nonmonotone incentive schemes non-monotone likelihood ratio property |
| JEL: | | D86 G11 G20 G30 J33 M52 |
| Document Type: | | Article |
| Appears in Collections: | | Estudios de Economia, Department of Economics, University of Chile
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