Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66714
Authors: 
Loyola, Gino
Portilla, Yolanda
Year of Publication: 
2010
Citation: 
[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 37 [Year:] 2010 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 43-66
Abstract (Translated): 
This article characterizes the properties of the compensation scheme of delegated portfolio management that would lead to the selection of high risk-high return portfolios. In particular, it provides conditions under which a non-monotone payment structure emerges as an optimal contract, which rewards extreme results and punishes moderate ones.
Subjects: 
executive compensation
delegated portfolio management
nonmonotone incentive schemes
non-monotone likelihood ratio property
JEL: 
D86
G11
G20
G30
J33
M52
Document Type: 
Article

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