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Title:Esquemas de incentivos y carteras de inversión innovadoras PDF Logo
Authors:Loyola, Gino
Portilla, Yolanda
Issue Date:2010
Citation:[Journal:] Estudios de Economía [ISSN:] 0718-5286 [Volume:] 37 [Year:] 2010 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 43-66
Abstract (Translated):This article characterizes the properties of the compensation scheme of delegated portfolio management that would lead to the selection of high risk-high return portfolios. In particular, it provides conditions under which a non-monotone payment structure emerges as an optimal contract, which rewards extreme results and punishes moderate ones.
Subjects:executive compensation
delegated portfolio management
nonmonotone incentive schemes
non-monotone likelihood ratio property
JEL:D86
G11
G20
G30
J33
M52
Document Type:Article
Appears in Collections:Estudios de Economia, Department of Economics, University of Chile

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