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dc.contributor.authorRuiz-Porras, Antonioen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-21T13:17:29Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-21T13:17:29Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.citationEstudios de Economía 0718-5286 37 2010 1 67-104en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66695-
dc.language.isospaen_US
dc.publisherUniversidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía Santiago de Chileen_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelD92en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbankingen_US
dc.subject.keywordprivatizationen_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordperformanceen_US
dc.subject.keyworddepositsen_US
dc.titlePrivatización, competencia por depósitos y desempeño bancariosen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ppn636476308en_US
dc.description.abstracttransIn this article we develop a microeconomic framework to study the relationships among privatization, competition for deposits and performance in banking. Particularly, we analyze banking privatization when competitive strategies of the Cournot and Stackelberg types are allowed. Our findings show that some conditions are necessary to justify it under the following criteria: (i) efficiency, (ii) market power/financial stability and (iii) consumption availability for depositors. They also show that privatizations are relatively easy to justify when leader-follower relationships are allowed in the banking system. Even government revenues, due to privatization, are higher when these relationships exist.en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Estudios de Economia, Department of Economics, University of Chile

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