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Title:Indirect evolution versus strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions PDF Logo
Authors:Dufwenberg, Martin
Güth, Werner
Issue Date:1997
Series/Report no.:Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1997,28
Abstract:The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care for sales in addition to profits. Whereas strategic delegation does not change the market results as compared to the usual duopoly solution, indirect evolution causes a more competitive behavior. Thus the case at hand suffices to demonstrate the difference between the two approaches in explaining economic institutions.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064149
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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