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dc.contributor.authorBrennan, Geoffreyen_US
dc.contributor.authorGüth, Werneren_US
dc.contributor.authorKliemt, Hartmuten_US
dc.description.abstractCan a court system conceivably control opportunistic behavior if judges are selected from the same population as ordinary citizens and thus are no better than the rest of us? This paper provides a new and, as we claim, quite profound rational choice answer to that unsolved riddle. Adopting an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation the complex interactions between moral intrinsic motivation to behave non-opportunistically and extrinsic formal controls of opportunism are analysed. Under the assumption that judges are no better than ordinary citizens it is shown that introducing a court system can nevertheless prevent that the more trustworthy are driven out. It cannot be excluded, though, that courts may themselves crowd out trustworthiness under certain circumstances.en_US
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1997,44en_US
dc.subject.keywordTrust relationshipsen_US
dc.subject.keywordEvolutionary game theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordIntrinsic motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordCourt systemen_US
dc.subject.keywordLegal litigationen_US
dc.subject.keywordHobbesian problem of social orderen_US
dc.titleTrust in the shadow of the courts if judges are no betteren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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