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Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66241
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| Title: | | Third- and higher-price auctions  |
| Authors: | | Wolfstetter, Elmar |
| Issue Date: | | 1995 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1996,3 |
| Abstract: | | This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders' valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction, and lower bids when the number of bidders is increased. |
| Subjects: | | auctions procurement |
| JEL: | | D44 D82 H57 C72 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10075383 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin
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