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Title:Third- and higher-price auctions PDF Logo
Authors:Wolfstetter, Elmar
Issue Date:1995
Series/Report no.:Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1996,3
Abstract:This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders' valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction, and lower bids when the number of bidders is increased.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10075383
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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