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dc.contributor.authorDulleck, Uween_US
dc.description.abstractIn Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium players use strategies that condition on the number of messages sent. Therefore - induction under the assumption of bounded rational behavior of at least one player leads to a more intuitive equilibrium in the E-mail game.en_US
dc.publisherHumboldt-Universität Berlinen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDiscussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1997,47en_US
dc.subject.keywordSubgame Perfect Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordInformation setsen_US
dc.subject.keywordImperfect recallen_US
dc.titleA note on the E-mail game: Bounded rationality and inductionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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