Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66233
Authors: 
Dulleck, Uwe
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1997,47
Abstract: 
In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium players use strategies that condition on the number of messages sent. Therefore - induction under the assumption of bounded rational behavior of at least one player leads to a more intuitive equilibrium in the E-mail game.
Subjects: 
Induction
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Information sets
Imperfect recall
JEL: 
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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