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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66233
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| Title: | | A note on the E-mail game: Bounded rationality and induction  |
| Authors: | | Dulleck, Uwe |
| Issue Date: | | 1997 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1997,47 |
| Abstract: | | In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium players use strategies that condition on the number of messages sent. Therefore - induction under the assumption of bounded rational behavior of at least one player leads to a more intuitive equilibrium in the E-mail game. |
| Subjects: | | Induction Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Information sets Imperfect recall |
| JEL: | | C72 |
| Persistent Identifier of the first edition: | | urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064273 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin
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