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Title:A note on the E-mail game: Bounded rationality and induction PDF Logo
Authors:Dulleck, Uwe
Issue Date:1997
Series/Report no.:Discussion Papers, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes 1997,47
Abstract:In Rubinstein's (1989) E-mail game there exists no Nash equilibrium where players use strategies that condition on the E-mail communication. In this paper I restrict the utilizable information for one player. I show that in contrast to Rubinstein's result, in a payoff dominant Nash equilibrium players use strategies that condition on the number of messages sent. Therefore - induction under the assumption of bounded rational behavior of at least one player leads to a more intuitive equilibrium in the E-mail game.
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Information sets
Imperfect recall
Persistent Identifier of the first edition:urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10064273
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Discussion Papers, SFB 373, HU Berlin

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