|
EconStor >
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) >
Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66212
|
| | |
| Title: | | Party cues in elections under multilevel governance: Theory and evidence from US states  |
| Authors: | | Geys, Benny Vermeir, Jan |
| Issue Date: | | 2012 |
| Series/Report no.: | | Discussion Paper, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB), Research Area 'Markets and Politics', Research Professorship & Project 'The Future of Fiscal Federalism' SP II 2012-107 |
| Abstract: | | In federal countries, competence for policy matters is often shared between various levels of government. As only overall outcomes are observed, this might blur accountability by decreasing voters' ability to infer information about the performance of their leaders. In this article, we analyse how party cues (i.e., politicians' party membership acting as a cue towards their characteristics) affect voters' incomplete information about politicians in a federal setting. We first of all show that party cues allow indirect inference regarding politicians using observed policy outcomes, alleviating the accountability problem. Empirical evidence from US presidential election results across all 50 US states over the period 1972-2008 provides support for this proposition. Yet, while the availability of party cues in a federal setting increases the national incumbents' effort in some cases, it may reduce effort particularly when the regional incumbent if of a different party. |
| Subjects: | | federalism accountability multilevel governance party cues |
| JEL: | | D72 H30 H77 |
| Document Type: | | Working Paper |
| Appears in Collections: | | Publikationen von Forscherinnen und Forschern des WZB Discussion Papers, Forschungsprofessur & Projekt "The Future of Fiscal Federalism"
|
| |
| | |
Download bibliographical data as:
BibTeX
|
| |
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66212
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|