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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66210
  

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dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen_US
dc.contributor.authorRösch, Jürgenen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchultz, Luis Manuelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-16T12:07:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-16T12:07:17Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-073-4en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66210-
dc.description.abstractWe explore whether buyer groups, in which firms legally purchase inputs jointly, facilitate collusion in the product market. In a repeated game, abandoning the buyer group altogether or excluding single firms from them constitute more severe credible threats, hence, in theory buyer groups facilitate collusion. We run several experimental treatments in a three-firm Cournot framework to test these predictions, and we also explore the impact communication has on buyer groups. The experimental results show that buyer groups lead to lower outputs when groups can exclude single firms. Communication is identified as a main factor causing collusive product markets.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE Discussion Paper 74en_US
dc.subject.jelC7en_US
dc.subject.jelC9en_US
dc.subject.jelL4en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbuyer groupsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcartelsen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcommunicationen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordrepeated gamesen_US
dc.titleDo buyer groups facilitate collusion?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn729887863en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:74-
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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