Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66121
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dc.contributor.authorBilotkach, Volodymyren_US
dc.contributor.authorHüschelrath, Kaien_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-08T16:16:50Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-08T16:16:50Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66121-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the issue of market foreclosure by airline partnerships with antitrust immunity. Overlapping data on frequency of service and passenger volumes on non-stop transatlantic routes with information on the dynamics of airline partnerships, we find evidence consistent with the airlines operating under antitrust immunity refusing to accept connecting passengers from the outside carriers at respective hub airports. Following the antitrust immunity, airlines outside the partnership reduce their traffic to the partner airlines' hub airports by 4.1-11.5 percent. We suggest regulators should take possible market foreclosure effects into account when assessing the competitive effects of antitrust immunity for airline alliances.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x10-083 [rev.]en_US
dc.subject.jelL41en_US
dc.subject.jelL93en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordair transportationen_US
dc.subject.keywordalliancesen_US
dc.subject.keywordantitrust immunityen_US
dc.subject.keywordforeclosureen_US
dc.titleAirline alliances, antitrust immunity and market foreclosureen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn729304582en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:10083r-

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