Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/66062
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dc.contributor.authorBoom, Anetteen_US
dc.contributor.authorSchwenen, Sebastianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-07T14:06:25Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-07T14:06:25Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/66062-
dc.description.abstractWe examine welfare effects of real-time pricing in electricity markets. Before stochastic energy demand is known, competitive retailers contract with final consumers who exogenously do not have real-time meters. After demand is realized, two electricity generators compete in a uniform price auction to satisfy demand from retailers acting on behalf of subscribed customers and from consumers with real-time meters. Increasing the number of consumers on real-time pricing does not always increase welfare since risk-averse consumers dislike uncertain and high prices arising through market power. In the Bertrand case, welfare is the same with all or no consumers on smart meters.en_US
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisherZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft |xKiel und Hamburgen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBeiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2012: Neue Wege und Herausforderungen für den Arbeitsmarkt des 21. Jahrhunderts - Session: Energy Markets |xF06-V2en_US
dc.subject.jelD42en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelD44en_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.jelL12en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.titleReal-time Pricing in Power Markets: Who Gains?en_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn730539202-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:vfsc12:66062-

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