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dc.contributor.authorMatthews, Kenten_US
dc.contributor.authorMatthews, Owenen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-11-02T14:28:17Z-
dc.date.available2012-11-02T14:28:17Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/65789-
dc.description.abstractThe positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk taking is a well established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in a chorus of demands to control banker’s bonuses and thereby curtail their risk taking activities in the hope that the world can avoid a repeat in the future. However, the positive relationship is not a causative one. In this paper we argue that the cushioning of banks downside risks provide the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and design compensation packages to deliver high returns. Macro-prudential regulation will have a better chance of curbing excess risk taking than controlling banker’s compensation.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCardiff Univ, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section Cardiffen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCardiff Economics Working Papers E2009/27en_US
dc.subject.jelG21en_US
dc.subject.jelG28en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordbanker’s bonusen_US
dc.subject.keywordrisk takingen_US
dc.subject.keywordtoo-big-to-failen_US
dc.subject.keywordmacro-prudential regulationen_US
dc.subject.stwBanken_US
dc.subject.stwFührungskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwAnreizvertragen_US
dc.subject.stwBankenaufsichten_US
dc.subject.stwFinanzmarktkriseen_US
dc.subject.stwWelten_US
dc.titleControlling banker's bonuses: Efficient regulation or politics of envy?en_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn622724703en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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