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Title:Anti-dumping regulations: Anti-competitive and anti-export PDF Logo
Authors:Collie, David R.
Vo Phuong Mai Le
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2008/27
Abstract:In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an anti-dumping regulation can be strategically exploited by the domestic firm to reduce the degree of competition in the domestic market. The domestic firm commits not to export to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the domestic firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the domestic market are large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports.
Subjects:anti-dumping regulations
Bertrand oligopoly
strategic behaviour
JEL:F13
L13
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Cardiff Economics Working Papers

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