EconStor >
Cardiff University >
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University >
Cardiff Economics Working Papers >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65785
  
Title:X-efficiency versus rent seeking in Chinese banks: 1997 - 2006 PDF Logo
Authors:Matthews, Kent
Guo, Jianguang
Zhang, Xu
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2008/26
Abstract:This study demarcates cost-inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and rent-seeking-inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 10 joint-stock banks over the period 1997-2006. The paper adjusts for the quality of loans by treating NPLs as a negative output. The paper shows that Chinese banks have reduced cost inefficiency and reduced X-inefficiency at a faster rate than rent-seeking inefficiency.
Subjects:Bank Efficiency
China
X-inefficiency
DEA.
Bootstrapping
JEL:D23
G21
G28
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Cardiff Economics Working Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
588141461.pdf313.86 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65785

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.