EconStor >
Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf >
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf >
DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

Full metadata record

DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorMuck, Johannesen_US
dc.contributor.authorHeimeshoff, Ulrichen_US
dc.description.abstractWe explore the existence of first mover advantages in mobile telecommunications markets. Building on a data set comprising monthly penetration rates, market concentration, number of active operators, and market shares of 90 followers from 33 OECD countries, we estimate a dynamic growth model. Our analysis delivers five key results. Regarding a follower's longrun market share, we observe that (1) the penetration rate at the time of market entry exerts an inverted u-shaped effect, suggesting the existence of an optimal time for issuing additional licenses for mobile network operation; (2) the concentration rate at market entry exerts a positive effect, implying that it is easier for followers to enter a more concentrated market; (3) both the number of active operators at market entry and the number of currently active operators have a negative impact. Furthermore, we find that a follower's rate of convergence to the long-run market share is (4) negatively influenced by the current market concentration and number of active operators; (5) negatively affected by changes in the penetration rate since market entry, which strongly indicates the presence of substantial first mover advantages for pioneering network operators.en_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE Discussion Paper 71en_US
dc.subject.keywordFirst mover advantagesen_US
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric regulationen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarket share convergenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordMobile telecommunicationsen_US
dc.titleFirst mover advantages in mobile telecommunications: Evidence from OECD countriesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
728888483.pdf477.79 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Show simple item record
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.