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Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf >
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf >
DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65677
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Muck, Johannes | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Heimeshoff, Ulrich | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-10-30 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-10-31T12:53:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-10-31T12:53:13Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.isbn | | 978-3-86304-070-3 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/65677 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We explore the existence of first mover advantages in mobile telecommunications markets. Building on a data set comprising monthly penetration rates, market concentration, number of active operators, and market shares of 90 followers from 33 OECD countries, we estimate a dynamic growth model. Our analysis delivers five key results. Regarding a follower's longrun market share, we observe that (1) the penetration rate at the time of market entry exerts an inverted u-shaped effect, suggesting the existence of an optimal time for issuing additional licenses for mobile network operation; (2) the concentration rate at market entry exerts a positive effect, implying that it is easier for followers to enter a more concentrated market; (3) both the number of active operators at market entry and the number of currently active operators have a negative impact. Furthermore, we find that a follower's rate of convergence to the long-run market share is (4) negatively influenced by the current market concentration and number of active operators; (5) negatively affected by changes in the penetration rate since market entry, which strongly indicates the presence of substantial first mover advantages for pioneering network operators. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | DICE Düsseldorf | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | DICE Discussion Paper 71 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L96 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | K23 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O33 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | First mover advantages | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Asymmetric regulation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Market share convergence | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Mobile telecommunications | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Mobilkommunikation | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Markteintritt | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Marktanteil | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Schätzung | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | OECD-Staaten | | en_US |
| dc.title | | First mover advantages in mobile telecommunications: Evidence from OECD countries | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 728888483 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:dicedp:71 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
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