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dc.contributor.authorMeier, Volkeren_US
dc.contributor.authorRainer, Helmuten_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-26T12:13:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-10-26T12:13:37Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/65657-
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores the implications of gender-based income taxation in a non- cooperative model of a couple's time allocation between market work and providing a household public good. We find that the optimal structure of differential taxation by gender is solely determined by spouses' relative marginal rates of substitution between the public household good and private consumption. Breaking down this general rule into the primitives of the model, the spouse with a lower personal valuation of the public household good should be taxed at a higher rate. If these valuations are identical, a comparative advantage in home production relative to market work will imply a higher marginal tax rate. Using a realistic calibration, we show that these two results may combine to imply a higher optimal tax rate on female labor supply. This result stands in sharp contrast to previous models of gender-based taxation in which households select Pareto efficient allocations. Extending the model to include altruistic preferences, leisure, or human capital accumulation reduces optimal tax rates, while sequential labor supply decisions affect the optimal tax rate of the primary earner in an ambiguous direction.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo Working Paper: Labour Markets 3966en_US
dc.subject.jelD13en_US
dc.subject.jelH21en_US
dc.subject.jelJ22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordgender-based taxationen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-cooperative family decision-makingen_US
dc.subject.stwEinkommensteueren_US
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen_US
dc.subject.stwGeschlechten_US
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwWeibliche Arbeitskräfteen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsangeboten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleBeyond Ramsey: Gender-based taxation with non-cooperative couplesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn728269619en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
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