EconStor >
University of Essex >
Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of Essex >
EUROMOD Working Paper Series, Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of Essex  >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64899
  
Title:Tax-benefit revealed social preferences PDF Logo
Authors:Bourguignon, François
Spadaro, Amedeo
Issue Date:2008
Series/Report no.:EUROMOD Working Paper EM9/08
Abstract:This paper inverts the usual logic of applied optimal income taxation. It starts from the observed distribution of income before and after redistribution and corresponding marginal tax rates. Under a set of simplifying assumptions, it is then possible to recover the social welfare function that would make the observed marginal tax rate schedule optimal. In this framework, the issue of the optimality of an existing tax-benefit system is transformed into the issue of the shape of the social welfare function associated with that system and whether it satisfies elementary properties. This method is applied to the French redistribution system with the interesting implication that the French redistribution authority may appear, under some plausible scenario concerning the size of the labor supply behavioral reactions, non Paretian (e.g. giving negative marginal social weights to the richest class of tax payers).
Subjects:Social Welfare Function
Optimal Income Tax
Microsimulation
Optimal Inverse Problem
JEL:H11
H21
D63
C63
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:EUROMOD Working Paper Series, Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), University of Essex

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
583831400.pdf1.06 MBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64899

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.