|
EconStor >
ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München >
CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64858
|
| | |
Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Luechinger, Simon | | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | | Moser, Christoph | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-09-26 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-10-11T15:56:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-10-11T15:56:00Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64858 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | We analyze stock market reactions to announcements of political appointments from the private sector and corporate appointments of former government officials. Using unique data on corporate affiliations and announcements of all Senate-confirmed U.S. Defense Department appointees of six administrations, we find positive abnormal returns for political appointments. These estimates are not driven by important observations, volatile stocks or industry-wide developments. Placebo events yield no effects. Effects are larger for top government positions and less anticipated announcements. We also find positive abnormal returns for corporate appointments. Our results suggest that conflicts of interest matter also in a country with strong institutions. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | CESifo München | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | CESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 3921 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G14 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D73 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | G30 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | H57 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | political appointees | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | revolving door | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | conflict of interest | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | event study | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | stock market | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Führungswechsel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Regierungswechsel | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Politiker | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Interessenpolitik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Börsenkurs | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Rüstungsindustrie | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | USA | | en_US |
| dc.title | | The value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock market | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 726451789 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich
|
Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.
|