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dc.contributor.authorLuechinger, Simonen_US
dc.contributor.authorMoser, Christophen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-26en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-11T15:56:00Z-
dc.date.available2012-10-11T15:56:00Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64858-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze stock market reactions to announcements of political appointments from the private sector and corporate appointments of former government officials. Using unique data on corporate affiliations and announcements of all Senate-confirmed U.S. Defense Department appointees of six administrations, we find positive abnormal returns for political appointments. These estimates are not driven by important observations, volatile stocks or industry-wide developments. Placebo events yield no effects. Effects are larger for top government positions and less anticipated announcements. We also find positive abnormal returns for corporate appointments. Our results suggest that conflicts of interest matter also in a country with strong institutions.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCESifo Münchenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesCESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 3921en_US
dc.subject.jelG14en_US
dc.subject.jelD73en_US
dc.subject.jelG30en_US
dc.subject.jelH57en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordpolitical appointeesen_US
dc.subject.keywordrevolving dooren_US
dc.subject.keywordconflict of interesten_US
dc.subject.keywordevent studyen_US
dc.subject.keywordstock marketen_US
dc.subject.stwFührungswechselen_US
dc.subject.stwRegierungswechselen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitikeren_US
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwBörsenkursen_US
dc.subject.stwRüstungsindustrieen_US
dc.subject.stwUSAen_US
dc.titleThe value of the revolving door: Political appointees and the stock marketen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn726451789en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:CESifo Working Papers, CESifo Group Munich

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