Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64841
Authors: 
Kalenborn, Christine
Lessmann, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper: Public Choice 3917
Abstract: 
This paper empirically analyzes the joint impact of democracy and press freedom on corruption. Based in the theoretical literature, we argue that both institutional features are complements rather than substitutes in controlling corruption. Our regressions are based on a cross section of 170 countries covering the period from 2005 to 2010 as well as on panel evidence for 175 countries from 1996 to 2010. The results show that democratic elections only work in controlling corruption, if there is a certain degree of press freedom in a country, vice versa. Our policy implication is that democratic reforms are more effective if they are accompanied by institutional reforms strengthening the monitoring of politicians.
Subjects: 
democracy
corruption
press freedom
interaction effects
JEL: 
C21
D73
O50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
621.12 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.