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Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW), Kiel >
Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers >
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http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64824
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Hildenbrand, Andreas | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-10-11 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-10-11T13:39:55Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-10-11T13:39:55Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2012 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64824 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | Industrial organization is mainly concerned with the behavior of large firms, especially when it comes to oligopoly theory. Experimental industrial organization therefore faces a problem: How can firms be brought into the laboratory? The main approach relies on framing: Call individuals firms! This experimental approach is not in line with modern industrial organization, according to which a firm's market behavior is also determined by its organizational structure. In this paper, a Stackelberg experiment is considered in order to answer the question whether framing individual decision making as organizational decision making or implementing an organizational structure is more effective in generating profit-maximizing behavior. Firms are either represented by individuals or by teams. Teams are organized according to Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) contractual view of the firm. I find that teams' quantity choices are more in line with the assumption of profit maximization than individuals' choices. Compared to individuals, teams appear to be less inequality averse. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Economics Discussion Papers 2012-53 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C72 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C91 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C92 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D43 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | L13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | industrial organization | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | Stackelberg game | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | individual behaviour | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | team behaviour | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | framing | | en_US |
| dc.subject.keyword | | experimental economics | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Is a "firm" a firm? A Stackelberg experiment | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 727377787 | | en_US |
| dc.rights.license | | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.repec | | RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201253 | | - |
| Appears in Collections: | | Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal - Discussion Papers
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