EconStor >
Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf >
Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Düsseldorf >
DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64807
  
Title:Motivational cherry picking PDF Logo
Authors:Regner, Tobias
Riener, Gerhard
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:DICE Discussion Paper 68
Abstract:We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustor has the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisions either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play sequentially, follower trustees who are informed about the leader's choice are significantly more selfish than in the simultaneous move treatment, independent of the leader's choice. Leaders do not behave significantly different than in the baseline treatment. Follower trustees cherry pick the motivation that materially serves them best. When the leader trustee plays selfish, they tend to conform. When the leader makes a pro-social choice, followers seem to perceive the duty as already fulfilled by the leader. While guilt works well as a motivational force in a dyadic situation, it gets alleviated easily when the situation allows a shifting of responsibility.
Subjects:Team production
Trust
Choice architecture
Guilt aversion
Conformity
False consensus effect
Lab experiment
Cherry picking
JEL:D03
D71
C79
C92
ISBN:978-3-86304-067-3
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
727137433.pdf371.21 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64807

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.