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dc.contributor.authorRegner, Tobiasen_US
dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden_US
dc.description.abstractWe construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustor has the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisions either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play sequentially, follower trustees who are informed about the leader's choice are significantly more selfish than in the simultaneous move treatment, independent of the leader's choice. Leaders do not behave significantly different than in the baseline treatment. Follower trustees cherry pick the motivation that materially serves them best. When the leader trustee plays selfish, they tend to conform. When the leader makes a pro-social choice, followers seem to perceive the duty as already fulfilled by the leader. While guilt works well as a motivational force in a dyadic situation, it gets alleviated easily when the situation allows a shifting of responsibility.en_US
dc.publisherDICE Düsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesDICE Discussion Paper 68en_US
dc.subject.keywordTeam productionen_US
dc.subject.keywordChoice architectureen_US
dc.subject.keywordGuilt aversionen_US
dc.subject.keywordFalse consensus effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordLab experimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordCherry pickingen_US
dc.titleMotivational cherry pickingen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:DICE Discussion Paper, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

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