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dc.contributor.authorManski, Charles F.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-10-16T13:17:33Z-
dc.date.available2012-10-16T13:17:33Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.1920/wp.cem.2008.1008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64719-
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a broad theme about policy choice under ambiguity through study of a particular decision criterion. The broad theme is that, where feasible, choice between a status quo policy and an innovation is better framed as selection of a treatment allocation than as a binary decision. Study of the static minimax-regret criterion and its adaptive extension substantiate the theme. When the optimal policy is ambiguous, the static minimax-regret allocation always is fractional absent large fixed costs or deontological considerations. In dynamic choice problems, the adaptive minimax-regret criterion treats each cohort as well as possible, given the knowledge available at the time, and maximizes intertemporal learning about treatment response.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherCentre for Microdata Methods and Practice Londonen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriescemmap working paper CWP10/08en_US
dc.subject.jelD7en_US
dc.subject.jelH0en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwEntscheidungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwPolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwPräferenztheorieen_US
dc.titleAdaptive partial policy innovation: Coping with ambiguity through diversificationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn574281770en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:cemmap working papers, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

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