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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
cemmap working paper No. CWP12/12
Verlag: 
Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice (cemmap), London
Zusammenfassung: 
It is often argued that engaging in indoor residual spraying (IRS) in areas with high coverage of mosquito bed nets may discourage net ownership and use. This is just a case of a public program inducing perverse incentives. We analyze new data from a randomized control trial conducted in Eritrea which surprisingly shows the opposite: IRS encouraged net acquisition and use. Our evidence points to the role of imperfect information. The introduction of IRS may have made the problem of malaria more salient, leading to a change in beliefs about its importance and to an increase in private health investments.
Schlagwörter: 
Malaria
Bed nets
Indoor residual spray
Information
Beliefs
Behavior
JEL: 
D12
D83
H42
I12
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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