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dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden
dc.contributor.authorWiederhold, Simonen
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-24-
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:59:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:59:34Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-065-9en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64547-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups resulting from common experiences in the past. Our laboratory experiment shows that agents with previous common experiences with their principals (CE agents) perform better than agents without such experiences (NCE agents). However, as soon as actual control exceeds their expectation, CE agents decrease their performance substantially, which has no equivalent for NCE agents. This pronounced decrease in effort when control is perceived as excessive represents a novel channel through which hidden costs of control materialize. Our results have important implications for firms' strategies to motivate employees.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHeinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |cDüsseldorfen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x66en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelM54en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelJ22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordEmployee motivationen
dc.subject.keywordPrincipal-agent theoryen
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen
dc.titleTeam building and hidden costs of control-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn726312843en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:66en

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