Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64547
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dc.contributor.authorRiener, Gerharden_US
dc.contributor.authorWiederhold, Simonen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-24en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:59:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:59:34Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-065-9en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64547-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives. We propose a simple principal-agent model with control that incorporates the existence of social groups resulting from common experiences in the past. Our laboratory experiment shows that agents with previous common experiences with their principals (CE agents) perform better than agents without such experiences (NCE agents). However, as soon as actual control exceeds their expectation, CE agents decrease their performance substantially, which has no equivalent for NCE agents. This pronounced decrease in effort when control is perceived as excessive represents a novel channel through which hidden costs of control materialize. Our results have important implications for firms' strategies to motivate employees.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aDICE |cDüsseldorfen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x66en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelM54en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.jelJ22en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordEmployee motivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordPrincipal-agent theoryen_US
dc.subject.keywordExperimentsen_US
dc.titleTeam building and hidden costs of controlen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn726312843en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:66-

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