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dc.contributor.authorYan, Huibinen_US
dc.contributor.authorFriedman, Danielen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-22en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:41:59Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:41:59Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64539-
dc.description.abstractEach of n >= 1 identical buyers (and m >= 1 identical sellers) wants to buy (sell) a single unit of an indivisible good. The core predicts a unique and extreme outcome: the entire surplus is split evenly among the buyers when m > n and among the sellers when m < n; the long side gets nothing. We test this core conjecture in the lab with n + m = 3 or 5 randomly rematched traders and minimal imbalances (m = n +- 1) in three market institutions. In the standard continuous double auction, the surplus indeed goes overwhelmingly towards the short side. The DA-Chat institution allows traders to have cheap talk prior to the double auction, while the DA-Barg institution allows the long siders to negotiate enforceable profit sharing agreements while trading. Despite frequent attempts to collude and occasional large deviations from the core prediction, we find that successful collusion is infrequent in both new institutions. A disproportionate fraction of the successful collusions are accompanied by appeals to fairness.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics Santa Cruz, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department 640en_US
dc.subject.jelC71en_US
dc.subject.jelC78en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcoreen_US
dc.subject.keywordmarketen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten_US
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen_US
dc.subject.stwCoreen_US
dc.subject.stwKooperatives Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmechanismusen_US
dc.subject.stwUnteilbarkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAn experiment on the coreen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn587692707en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Economics Department, UC Santa Cruz

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