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Working Papers, Economics Department, UC Santa Cruz >
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64516
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Full metadata record
| DC Field | | Value | | Language |
| dc.contributor.author | | Robinson, Jonathan | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2010-03-22 | | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | | 2012-09-28T12:41:42Z | | - |
| dc.date.available | | 2012-09-28T12:41:42Z | | - |
| dc.date.issued | | 2008 | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/64516 | | - |
| dc.description.abstract | | This paper presents results from a randomized field experiment to test for the importance of limited commitment (due to incomplete contract enforceability) in explaining intra-household risk sharing arrangements in Kenya. The experiment followed 142 daily income earners and their spouses for 8 weeks. Every week, each individual had a 50% chance of receiving a 150 Kenyan shilling (US $2) income shock (equivalent to about 1.5 days income for men and 1 week's income for women). This paper has 2 main results. First, since the experimental payments are random, they allow for a direct test of allocative Pareto efficiency. I reject efficiency, as male private goods expenditures are sensitive to the receipt of the payment. Second, the experiment varied the level of intra-household correlation in the experimental payments between couples. I find that women send bigger transfers to their husbands when shocks are independent or negatively correlated, a result consistent with the presence of limited commitment. I find no difference in transfers for men, likely because the shocks were too small to cause the limited commitment constraint to bind for them. | | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | | eng | | en_US |
| dc.publisher | | Univ. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics Santa Cruz, Calif. | | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | | Working Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department 639 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | C93 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D13 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | D61 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.jel | | O12 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.ddc | | 330 | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Familienökonomik | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Privater Transfer | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Test | | en_US |
| dc.subject.stw | | Kenia | | en_US |
| dc.title | | Limited insurance within the household: Evidence from a field experiment in Kenya | | en_US |
| dc.type | | Working Paper | | en_US |
| dc.identifier.ppn | | 587692138 | | en_US |
| dc.rights | | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | | en_US |
| Appears in Collections: | | Working Papers, Economics Department, UC Santa Cruz
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