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dc.contributor.authorCason, Timothy N.en_US
dc.contributor.authorFriedman, Danielen_US
dc.contributor.authorHopkins, Eden_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-23en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-28T12:41:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-09-28T12:41:34Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/64507-
dc.description.abstractWe report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP' (Time Average of the Shapley Polygon) gives a precise prediction about what happens when there is divergence from equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a fourth strategy, Dumb. Nash equilibrium places a weight of 1/2 on Dumb in both games, but the TASP places no weight on Dumb when the equilibrium is unstable. We also vary the level of monetary payoffs with higher payoffs predicted to increase instability. We find that the high payoff unstable treatment differs from the others. Frequency of Dumb is lower and play is further from Nash than in the other treatments. That is, we find support for the comparative statics prediction of learning theory, although the frequency of Dumb is substantially greater than zero in the unstable treatments.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherUniv. of California at Santa Cruz, Dep. of Economics Santa Cruz, Calif.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers, UC Santa Cruz Economics Department 660en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelC92en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordgamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordTASPen_US
dc.subject.keywordlearningen_US
dc.subject.keywordunstableen_US
dc.subject.keywordmixed equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordfictitious playen_US
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwLernprozessen_US
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTesting the TASP: An experimental investigation of learning in games with unstable equilibriaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn616909969en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
Appears in Collections:Working Papers, Economics Department, UC Santa Cruz

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